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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
charged so that he may prepare for trial. "'1 This end could just as
properly be fulfilled by the use of an information. Under a waiver provi-
sion the accused is given a new privilege without depriving him of any
right. By waiving indictment, the accused has the benefit of a trial un-
hampered by undue delay and the taxpayers have the benefit of a less
costly and less cumbersome accusatory procedure.
J. H. ALESIA
INJUNCTION - PRELIMINARY AND INTERLOCUTORY INJUNCTIONS -
WHETHER A FAILURE TO SEASONABLY RAISE A STATUTORY OBJECTION TO
THE ISSUANCE OF A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION BARS AN AwARD OF DAMAGES
ON 'THE SUBSEQUENT DISSOLUTION OF THE INJUNCTIoN-Further illumina-
tion of the right of a defendant against whom an injunction has been
wrongfully issued to receive an award of damages has been provided in
the recent case of Presbyterian Distribution Service v. Chicago National
Bank.' The case arose with the entry of a judgment by confession in favor
of the defendant and against the plaintiff herein. Upon notice and hear-
ing in the trial court, a preliminary injunction was issued in favor of
the plaintiff which restrained the defendant from enforcing the judgment.
At that time, the defendant failed to object even though the bond required
by statute was not posted.2 Shortly thereafter, the defendant successfully
moved to vacate the order granting the injunction on the ground that the
plaintiff had failed to post the mandatory bond and, at this suggestion,
was awarded damages by the trial court.3 The Appellate Court for the
First District of Illinois reversed the award since the defendant neglected
to interpose an objection which, in all probability, would have been suc-
cessful and thus prevented the ensuing damage.
The Illinois General Assembly has heretofore enacted two statutes
inaugurating the right to an award of damages upon the dissolution of a
wrongfully issued preliminary injunction. The first measure was enacted
15 State v. Roche, 135 N. E. (2d) 789 (Ohio App., 1955).
121 Ill. App. (2d) 188, 157 N. H. (2d) 789 (1959).
2 Il. Rev. Stat. 1959, Vol. 2, Ch. 69, § 8, provides that prior to the issuance of an
injunction restraining the enforcement of a judgment the plaintiff must post a bond
in double the amount of the judgment and costs, plus an additional amount to
cover any damages that may be awarded in the event the injunction is dissolved.
8 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1959, Vol. 2, Ch. 69, § 12, which, in effect, provides that where a
preliminary injunction is dissolved, the successful party may be awarded any dam-
ages sustained while the injunction was in force.
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1959, Vol. 2, Ch. 69, § 8, which, in effect, provides that upon the dis-
solution of an injunction issued to restrain the enforcement of a judgment the
plaintiff can be assessed damages not to exceed ten per cent of the monetary value
of the judgment released, exclusive of interest and costs.
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in 1819 and provided a remedy upon the dissolution of a preliminary in-
junction which had restrained the enforcement of a judgment at law.4
This legislation was adopted to penalize errant judgment debtors who
wrongfully obtained injunctive relief to stay the execution of a judgment.5
Apparently the legislature, at that early date, had no intention of allowing
full compensation to the injured judgment creditor, since no award of
damages could lawfully exceed six per cent of the monetary value of the
judgment, exclusive of court costs and legal interest.6  In 1827, the act
was amended by increasing the arbitrary damage limitation to ten per cent
of the dollar value of the judgment. 7 A ten per cent award of damages
was by no means mandatory and the court had the power to hear any
evidence of damages in order to formulate an equitable award within the
statutory limitation.8 The act as amended is in substance the law in effect
today.9
The second provision was passed in 1861 and expressly applied "in
all cases" wherein a wrongfully issued preliminary injunction was dis-
solved.10 Unlike the earlier statute, the act of 1861 was void of any
restriction or limitation on the amount of damages assessable, but it did
contain the added requirement that the litigant seeking damages submit,
in writing, suggestions of damages. This remedy remains in force today."
Each of the aforementioned statutes provided a different remedy to
the litigant who successfully obtained the dissolution of a wrongfully
issued preliminary injunction which had enjoined the collection of a judg-
ment. As a result of the inconsistency in the remedies available, the
question was generated as to whether the earlier statute was impliedly
overruled with the passage of the act of 1861.12 There were two factors
which motivated an affirmative answer to the question. First, the legisla-
tion expressly applied "in all cases" which was indicative of the fact that
the scope of the act of 1861 was meant to be all inclusive. Secondly, from
an economic viewpoint the remedy set forth in the latter law was much
more favorable than its earlier counterpart, since it was free from arbitrary
limitations on the amount of damages assessable. Yet, in 1864, the Su-
preme Court of Illinois held that the act of 1861 was not intended to be
4 Laws 1819, p. 173, § 17.
5 Hollister v. Sobra, 264 fl1. 535, 106 N. E. 507 (1914).
6 Id.
7 Laws 1827-35, p. 306, § 11.
8 Dunn v. Wilkinson, 26 Ill. App. 26 (1887).
9 IlL. Rev. Stat. 1959, Vol. 2, Ch. 69, § 8.
10 Laws 1861, p. 133, § 1.
11 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1959, Vol. 2, Ch. 69, § 2.
12 The question arose in Roberts v. Fahs, 36 Ill. 268 (1864).
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all inclusive and did not encompass that class of cases theretofore governed
by the terms of the act of 1819 as amended in 1827.'3 Since 1864, the
courts have consistently ruled that the litigant who successfully obtained
the dissolution of a preliminary injunction which had stayed the collec-
tion of a judgment could under no circumstances recover damages in
excess of ten per cent of the monetary value of the judgment. 14
In the instant case, the defendant moved, after the dissolution of the
injunction restraining the enforcement of the judgment, for an assessment
of damages. 15 At the hearing on the motion, the defendant was awarded
a sum of damages in excess of the total monetary value of the judgment.18
On appeal, the plaintiff contended that the defendant's conduct, prior to
the time the injunction was issued, amounted to a forfeiture of his right
to recover any damages from the plaintiff.'7 This contention was pred-
icated on the equitable principle that the defendant ". . . ought to be in
no position in a court of equity to demand damages, when he was at fault
in not interposing such proper resistance as would probably have controlled
judicial discretion in his favor. "18 This concept was announced, although
not followed, in the case of McNevin v. Stoolman.19 Therein, a preliminary
injunction was issued, without any resistance by the defendants, which
enjoined the defendants from transferring, selling, or otherwise interfering,
in any manner, with the right of the plaintiff to the control of certain
shares of corporate stock. Subsequently, the defendants successfully moved
to dissolve the injunction on the ground that the stock certificate in ques-
13 Roberts v. Fahs, 36 Ill. 268 (1864). In accord: Walker v. Pritchard et al.,
135 Ill. 103, 25 N. E. 573 (1890); Higgins v. Bullock, 73 fll. 205 (1874) ; Forth
et al. v. Town of Xenia, 54 Ill. 210 (1870) ; Smith et al. v. Powel et al., 50 Ill. 21
(1869); Shaffer v. Sutton, 49 Ill. 506 (1869).
14 Camp v. Bryan et al., 84 Ill. 250 (1876) ; Joslyn v. Dickerson et al., 71 Ill. 25
(1873) ; Nicoloff v. Schnipper et al., 233 Ill. App. 591 (1924) ; Stirlen v. Neustadt,
50 Ill. App. 378 (1893) ; Dunn v. Wilkinson, 26 Ill. App. 26 (1887) ; Reed v. New
York Exchange Bank, 230 Ill. 50, 82 N. E. 341 (1907), held to the contrary, but
was expressly overruled in Hollister v. Sobra, 264 Ill. 535, 106 N. E. 507 (1914).
15 The defendant claimed damages as provided in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1959, Vol. 2, Ch.
69, § 12.
16The amount of the defendant's judgment was $582.00, No. 47586, Appellate
Court for the First District of Illinois, Appellant's Brief, p. 13. In addition, the
defendant was awarded $673.00 in damages by the trial court, Presbyterian Distri-
bution Serv. v. Chicago Nat. Bank, 21 Ill. App. (2d) 188 at 191, 157 N. E. (2d)
789 at 791 (1959).
17 The plaintiff also urged that damages could only be awarded pursuant to Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1959, Vol. 2, Ch. 69, § 8, since the injunction was issued to enjoin the
enforcement of a judgment; therefore, any award of damages that exceeded ten
per cent of the dollar value of the judgment would be excessive. Although this
contention was not considered by the reviewing tribunal, it seems probable that the
plaintiff's contention would have been sustained had it been considered.
18 McNevin v. Stoolman, 235 Ill. App. 449 at 456 (1924). In general, see 43
C. J. S., Injunctions, § 315 (i), p. 1108, and 21 I. L. P., Injunctions, § 211, p. 745.
19 235 Ill. App. 449 (1924).
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tion was no longer outstanding, since it had been previously transferred
by the plaintiff and cancelled. Pursuant to the applicable statute, damages
were awarded the defendants at their suggestion.2" The reviewing tribunal
reversed and remanded the award of damages since it was excessive, but
did not preclude the defendants from recovery.
In the principal case, the defendant neglected to raise an objection
to the issuance of the preliminary injunction notwithstanding the plain-
tiff's failure to post the bond required by statute. It seems unlikely that
the defendant's failure to interpose resistance was due to a mistake or
the like, since the defendant's attorney stated, by affidavit, that on the
day prior to the issuance of the injunction he had researched the appli-
cable statute and precedents. It seems probable that, had the defendant
called the attention of the court to the statutory requirement, the injunc-
tion would not have issued wrongfully and hence no damage would have
ensued.
21
By holding that one is not entitled to recover damages where he fails
to seasonably object to the issuance of an injunction the court had adhered
to the policy of equity which precludes parties from recovering damages
caused by their own errors and omissions. Even though the court is
presumed to know and take judicial notice of the laws of the forum, it
still remains incumbent upon the litigant to inform the tribunal of the
applicable statutory requirements so as to prevent the entry of erroneous
orders. To permit parties, who fail to interpose resistance, to recover
damages would, in effect, open the door to temptation, since unscrupulous
litigants could intentionally remain mute in the hope that an injunction
would issue wrongfully and then seek redress by way of damages.
M. F. HAUSELMAN
INTERNAL REVENuE-DEDUCTIONS AND CREDITS-WHETHIR PAYMENTS
MADE ON A NOMINAL LOAN FROM AN INSURER, WHERE LOAN PROCEEDS WERE
USED TO ACQUIRE BENEFITS OF ANNUITY CONTRACT WITH INSURER, ARE
PROPER DEDUCTIONS FOR FEDERAL INCOME TAX PURPOSES-A question of
general interest to members of the legal profession, those engaged in tax
work, and indeed, many taxpayers, was raised in the recent case of Knetsch
v. United States.' The plaintiffs there concerned had purchased certain
20 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1959, Vol. 2, Ch. 69, § 12.
21 The issuance of an injunction to restrain the enforcement of a judgment is
wrongful when the statutory bond is not posted, Grossman v. Davis, 117 Ill. App.
354 (1904) ; Packer v. Roberts, 44 Ill. App. 232 (1892).
1 272 F. (2d) 200 (1959), affirming 58-2 U. S. T. C. 69, 739; certiorari granted,
361 U. S. 958.
